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Abstract 
In this paper we re-examine the implications of the differences between ‘doing’ and 
‘writing’ science and mathematics, questioning whether the way that science and 
mathematics are presented in textbooks or research articles creates a misleading 
picture of these differences. We focus our discussion on mathematics, in particular, 
on Reuben Hersh’s formulation of the contrast in terms of Goffman’s dramaturgical 
frontstage-backstage analogy and his claim that various myths about mathematics 
only fit with how mathematics is presented in the ‘front’, but not with how it is 
practised in the ‘back’. By investigating examples of both the ‘front’ (graduate 
lectures in mathematical logic) and the ‘back’ (meetings between supervisor and 
doctoral students) we examine, firstly, whether the ‘front’ of mathematics presents a 
misleading picture of mathematics, and, secondly, whether the ‘front’ and ‘back’ of 
mathematics are so discrepant that mathematics really does look certain in the 
‘front’, but fallible in the ‘back’.  
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In this paper we take another look at the implications of the differences between 
‘doing’ and ‘writing’ science; that is, the differences between how science is 
practised in the laboratory and how the results of those practices are subsequently 
presented in publications, lectures, or textbooks. We will focus on the applicability of 
this contrast to mathematics and discuss some empirical examples, but we are 
initially concerned with how the contrast is formulated in the literature on philosophy 
and sociology of science more generally (see, for example, Holmes, 1987; 
Schickore, 2008).i 
It is not itself surprising or of epistemological importance that there are differences 
between the various activities that are part of creating a particular product (a movie, 
a novel, or a scientific paper) and the properties of the final product. Why the 
contrast between ‘doing’ and ‘writing’ is seen as significant in the case of science 
derives from the view that science is presented in a way that misrepresents or 
mystifies how it is actually done. In that view, scientific writing creates a misleading 
picture of science, not only to those who do not know much about it (outsiders), but 
possibly also to practitioners themselves (insiders).ii  
With respect to the experimental sciences, the title of Peter Medawar’s (1963) paper 
‘Is the scientific paper a fraud?’ was an eye-catching way of formulating the issue. 
Medawar’s intention was not to claim that scientific papers are literal frauds (in the 
sense that they are based on obfuscated, fabricated, or manipulated data), but that 
their presentational conventions misrepresent the actual nature of the research they 
report. In his view, papers were written as though they had issued from an inductive 
method, when in reality they were produced by falsificationist procedures. Following 
Medawar, scientific papers have been seen to purvey a picture of science that fits an 
ideology rather than actual practice.iii In the case of mathematics, Reuben Hersh 
(1991) formulated the contrast by adapting Goffman’s (1956) dramaturgical 
metaphor to mathematics, to argue that ‘mathematics has a front and a back’, where 
the ‘front’ refers to how mathematics is presented (what Pólya [1954: vi] called 
‘finished mathematics’) and the ‘back’ to how it is actually done (what Pólya called 
‘mathematics in the making’). Like Medawar, Hersh argued that the ‘front’ is 
remarkably different from the ‘back’ and that the separation makes possible the 
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perpetuation of various myths about mathematics (in particular, that mathematics is 
an absolutely certain and a comprehensively logical affair). 
Much of this argument is based on the view that, depending on whether one looks at 
how science is written (the ‘front’) or is practiced in the laboratory (the ‘back’), two 
different pictures of science emerge, a view that was captured in Latour’s (1987) 
two-faced Janus figure of science (looking back to ‘all made science’ and forward to 
‘science in the making’). The picture that is supposed to be conveyed by the ‘front’ is 
the empiricist view of science that has been the target of recent philosophy and 
sociology of science. Crudely, this empiricist view is seen as picturing science as 
providing unmediated representations of an independent and determinate reality. In 
contrast, examining the ‘back’ reveals a different picture of the artifactual nature of 
scientific facts and theories and the fallible human process that constitutes them. In 
the case of mathematics, it is argued that an ‘absolutist’ or ‘formalist’ picture of 
mathematics fits with the ‘front’, while a ‘fallibilist’ or ‘constructivist’ picture emerges 
from the ‘back’. What is at stake is not only the ‘correctness’ of the two pictures, but 
their implications for the public authority of science. The first picture presents science 
as though it is entitled to absolute authority, meaning that non-scientists should 
assent to whatever they are told by the ‘experts’, because what they are told cannot 
possibly be mistaken. The second, alternate, picture is meant to liberate people from 
the first one by questioning the impression that science deserves such absolute 
authority, and even suggesting that it is no more than just another ideology. 
This polemical contrast between the two pictures presents them as conflicting, 
incommensurable, or radically different. Our aim in this paper is to de-polarize the 
contrast between the ‘front’ and the ‘back’ by looking at examples from both sides of 
the divide, using video-recordings of graduate lectures and doctoral supervision 
meetings respectively. Our goal is not to provide a characterization of how 
mathematics is ‘generally’ done, but to use our materials to dissolve the rigidity of the 
front/back contrast. Specifically, we engage with two questions: 
(1)  In which sense is the presentation of mathematics in the ‘front’ misleading? 
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(2) In which sense are the ‘front’ and the ‘back’ of mathematics radically 
divergent? 
With respect to (1), we question whether what happens in the ‘front’ actually fits the 
traditional (formalist or Platonist) picture of mathematics (which is the basis for the 
charge that the presentation of mathematics is misleading). With respect to (2), we 
argue that there is more ‘front’ in the ‘back’ (and vice versa) than is assumed in the 
debate. We argue that the treatment of the ‘front’ and the ‘back’ as a contrastive pair 
downplays the continuity of the two, in particular, that the ‘finished’ product in the 
‘front’ is a later stage and product of the ‘currently unfinished’ work in the ‘back’. 
Of course, there are differences between the way mathematics is presented in 
lectures and how it is practised at the blackboard in a research context, but we argue 
that this does not mean that there are different standards of certainty or forms of 
reasoning involved. Of course, questionable conceptions of mathematics circulate, 
but since many famous mathematicians such as Hilbert or even Euclid are among 
those who have exposed such misconceptions, it cannot be the exposure to the 
‘back’ that immunises people against mythical conceptions. People may have wrong 
ideas about mathematics, but we question whether these are direct results of the 
way textbooks, lectures, and other publications present mathematics.  
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The supposed segregation of ‘front’ from ‘back’ in mathematics 
There is likely be no disagreement that mathematics enjoys a special, even unique, 
place in (at least) Western culture. Mathematics is often placed at the pinnacle of 
rational thought, exceeding even the position of the natural sciences because of the 
crystalline clarity and associated cast-iron certainty of its results (see, e.g., Kline, 
1980: 4; Tymoczko, 1986: xiii; Ernest, 1991: xi). Furthermore, many people find 
anything beyond elementary mathematics inaccessibly difficult, consequently 
supposing that the ability to do more advanced mathematics is a criterion of superior 
intelligence.  
But what is the basis for thinking mathematics deserves such elevated standing? 
There are ideas about the ‘nature of mathematics’ that have been in circulation for a 
long time (some of them going back at least to Ancient Greece). The first is the 
certainty of mathematical results. As Henrion (1997: 235) puts it: 
What is it that distinguishes mathematical knowledge from 
other forms of knowledge? Students of all ages, whether they 
are studying algebra, trigonometry, geometry, or calculus, 
would agree on one universal theme: Mathematics is beyond 
doubt. A mathematical statement is either right or wrong, and 
any true statement can be proven. Moreover, once it is proved 
true, it can never later turn out to be false. 
The second is the logical character of mathematical reasoning — of arriving at those 
results. That is to say, mathematics may appear to have a special method, ‘pure 
logical reason’ (or ‘Reason’ with a capital R), which generates its certain results by 
operating strictly according to the laws of logic. Hersh (1991: 130) provides a 
succinct characterization of this: 
Mathematics possesses a method, called ‘proof’ or sometimes 
‘rigorous proof’, by which one attains absolute certainty of the 
conclusions, given the truth of the premises.  
These ideas have been questioned and characterized as mythsiv or ideologiesv. 
Since important aspects of these ideas are often attributed to the Ancient Greeks, 
Davis and Hersh (1981: 325) speak of the ‘Euclid myth’: 
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What is the Euclid myth? It is the belief that the books of Euclid 
contain truths about the universe which are clear and 
indubitable. Starting from self-evident truths, and proceeding by 
rigorous proof, Euclid arrives at knowledge which is certain, 
objective, and eternal. Even now, it seems that most educated 
people believe in the Euclid myth. Up to the middle of late 
nineteenth century, the myth was unchallenged. Everyone 
believed it. It has been the major support for metaphysical 
philosophy, that is, for philosophy which sought to establish 
some a prior certainty about the nature of the universe. 
As Davis and Hersh note, up until the middle of the nineteenth century, these ideas 
were relatively unchallenged in the philosophical literature. However, as a result of a 
variety of mathematical developments, starting with the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometries and culminating with the production of Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorems in the 1930s, the belief in the absolute certainty of mathematics was 
shattered and alternative conceptions of mathematics started to emerge. The aim of 
much recent work in philosophy, sociology, and educational studies of mathematics 
has been to expose and demystify the traditional mythology (e.g., Kline, 1980; Davis 
and Hersh, 1981; Wilder, 1981; Kitcher, 1983; Tymoczko, 1986; Livingston, 1986; 
Aspray and Kitcher, 1988; Lave, 1988; Echeverria et al., 1992; Gillies, 1992; Restivo 
et al., 1993; Ernest, 1991, 1998; Hersh, 2005). 
Despite the fact that the ‘loss of certainty’ (Kline, 1980) began more than a century 
ago and has been widely publicized, it seems that many of the myths about 
mathematics still persist. What explains their enduring presence? It has been argued 
that one important source of these myths is the way mathematics is presented in 
journals, conferences, textbooks, lectures, and so forth. The impression that 
mathematical results are certain may be a result of the fact that mathematical 
publications contain only the finished products of mathematical investigations. 
Typically, they do not mention all the things that did not work out, the reasons why 
certain things were preferred over others, or how the final theorem was evolved and 
modified during the course of proving. Standard mathematical publications have 
scarcely any historical elements, and, unlike scientific papers, do not even feature 
‘methods’ statements. Similarly, the impression that mathematics results are reached 
through a special method may be a result of how mathematics is presented in 
textbooks, journal articles, and lectures; in particular, the standard modern 
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‘definition-theorem-proof’ (DTP) format.vi This format may be taken to suggest that a 
mathematician started with clearly stated definitions on the basis of which he or she 
formed a conjecture, and then just wrote out the steps of the proof unhesitatingly one 
after the other. The format gives little or no information on how the definitions, 
theorems, or proofs were found, how they were modified in the course of the inquiry, 
or what the ‘real’ temporal development was.vii 
Campbell, for example, argues that although Euclid’s axiomatic procedure is a 
perspicuous way of presenting mathematics (since it highlights the assumptions, 
makes it easier to find gaps in the proof, etc.), it also carries with it a danger, since it 
may lead novices (students) to think that it is a representation of the reasoning that 
led to the final product (which, in turn, may lead students to try to reproduce such 
reasoning when doing mathematics themselves, which is impossible to do):  
Euclid’s axiomatic procedure is a breakthrough; it is a 
procedure for the unification of material. It allows key 
assumptions to stand out. It allows for systematic procedures of 
verification. But so long as students are misled into believing 
that the polished jewels are the actual reasoning rather than 
the end product of reasoning, just so long will it be that 
Euclidean geometry will remain a curse rather than a blessing 
to the teaching of reasoning. (Campbell, 1976: 342) 
The mathematician Armand Borel similarly argues that since mathematical papers 
do not mention various aspects of the investigative work, they give an impression 
that may mislead people to conceive of mathematicians as ‘thinking machines’: 
You should not believe that mathematicians are just thinking 
machines who always proceed in steps clearly planned with 
implacable logic. This impression is often given by papers. 
Those are organized for maximal efficiency of the exposition; 
omitting all the false leads, they often proceed in an order 
inverse to that which led to the discovery. (Borel, 1994: 144) 
The dangers of the ways that textbooks and lectures present mathematics,viii lead 
Ernest to speak of ‘pedagogical falsification’: 
Lakatos (1976) and others have criticized the pedagogical 
falsification perpetrated by the standard practice of presenting 
advanced learners with the sanitized outcomes of mathematical 
enquiry. Typically advanced mathematics text books conceal 
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the processes of knowledge construction by inverting or 
radically modifying the sequence of transformations used in 
mathematical invention, for presentational purposes. The 
outcome may be elegant texts meant for public consumption, 
but they also generate learning obstacles through this 
reformulation and inversion. (Ernest, 2008: 67) 
Like Campbell and Borel, Ernest argues that the standard format of presenting 
mathematics does not contain a description of the actual sequence of knowledge 
production, and thus does not allow students to learn how to make mathematical 
discoveries for themselves. Ernest’s formulation, however, is also sharper than those 
of Campbell and Borel. He speaks of ‘falsification’ and ‘conceal[ment]’, suggesting a 
more active role of the author of the text in creating these potentially negative 
aspects deliberately.  
In sum, the source of the various myths about mathematics is attributed to the 
differences between how mathematics is presented from how it is actually practised. 
Hersh (1991) crystallizes this contrast by applying to mathematics Goffman’s (1956) 
dramaturgical model of social establishments as divided between ‘front’ and a ‘back’ 
regions.ix In Goffman’s terms, social establishments are differentiated into spatially 
and/or socially segregated ‘regions’ by the need to project and sustain images 
through control of information. The ‘front’ region is the area in which a ‘performance’ 
is presented to a public, but the credibility of that performance is sustained by 
activities that need to be kept ’backstage’ since awareness of them might be 
distracting from, and either disruptive or discrediting of, the performance. Thus, in a 
restaurant, the ‘front’ is the dining area where customers are offered neatly 
presented dishes, which, of course, are the product of various ‘backstage’ activities 
in the kitchen. Furthermore, while the dining area is often quiet, neat, and tidy, the 
kitchen is smelly, noisy, and chaotic. There may also be real discrepancies in the 
behaviour of the waiting staff who may be politely subordinate in view of the 
customers, but disrespectful, even contemptuous, out of sight.  
One carry-over form Goffman’s model into Hersh’s use is the idea that what goes on 
‘in the back’ must be incongruous with what is presented ‘out front’: 
In this sense of the term, the ‘front’ mathematics is 
mathematics in ‘finished’ form, as it is presented to the public in 
9 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2011).  Does mathematics look certain in the front, but fallible in the back? 
Social Studies of Science 41 (6), 839‐866. 
 
classrooms, textbooks, and journals. The ‘back’ would be 
mathematics as it appears among working mathematicians, in 
informal settings, told to one another in an office behind closed 
doors. 
Compared to ‘backstage’ mathematics, ‘front’ mathematics is 
formal, precise, ordered and abstract. It is separated clearly 
into definitions, theorems, and remarks. To every question 
there is an answer, or at least, a conspicuous label: ‘open 
question’. The goal is stated at the beginning of each chapter, 
and attained at the end.  
Compared to ‘front’ mathematics, mathematics ‘in back’ is 
fragmentary, informal, intuitive, tentative. We try this or that, we 
say ‘maybe’ or ‘it looks like’. (Hersh, 1991: 128) 
Hersh uses the contrast between ‘front’ and ‘back’ to explain the origin of the myths 
associated with mathematics. Although mathematicians themselves may well know 
that their work does not conform to the ‘official’ image of mathematics,x they actively 
perpetuate the mythology through their publications and educational practices. The 
way Hersh talks about ‘the public’, however, introduces some confusion, as he 
seems to suggest that mathematical journals are directed to ‘the public’ as opposed 
to working mathematicians. Indeed, such an interpretation is forced on us by the 
following passage:  
… the front/back separation makes possible the preservation of 
a myth …. By a myth we shall mean simply taking the 
performance seen from up front at face value; failing to be 
aware that the performance seen ‘up front’ is created or 
concocted ‘behind the scenes’ in back. This myth, in many 
cases, adds to the customer’s enjoyment of the performance; it 
may even be essential. … 
Mathematics, too, has it myths. One of the unwritten criteria 
separating the professional from the amateur, the insider from 
the outsider, is that the outsiders are taken in (deceived), the 
insiders are not taken in. (Hersh, 1991: 129)  
This passage nicely captures the issue as Hersh sees it: it is not necessarily 
practitioners who are misled by the way that mathematics is presented in the ‘front’, 
but outsiders, amateurs, or novices. And what is it that these people fail to see? That 
the definitions, theorems, and proofs that are presented so neatly are the result of 
various activities (which include guesses, hunches, trials and errors) not reported in 
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the ‘front’ presentation. This way of presenting may contribute to their ‘enjoyment’,xi 
but it gives a false impression of what mathematics ‘is really like’. Note that Hersh 
here is not arguing about the efficiency of teaching technical mathematical skills (in 
contrast to, say, Pólya), but rather about how the way that mathematics is taught and 
presented conveys a particular picture of mathematics. To exaggerate Hersh’s 
argument: if mathematical papers and textbooks were set out differently, the Euclid 
myth would perhaps never have arisen. 
So why do mathematicians not present mathematics in a way that is more faithful to 
the reality of mathematical practice? Here, Hersh suggests that there is an 
advantage for mathematics and mathematicians to present mathematics in the 
‘traditional’ way. Thus mathematicians may not be themselves misled by the Euclid 
myth, but it may be in their interest for others to believe it: 
By calling these beliefs myths, I am not declaring them to be 
false. A myth need not be false to be a myth. The point is that it 
serves to support or validate some social institution …. 
… the unity, universality, objectivity, and certainty of 
mathematics are beliefs that support and justify the institution 
of mathematics. (For mathematics, which is an art and a 
science, is also an institution, with budgets, administrations, 
publications, conferences, rank, status, awards, grants, etc.) 
Part of the job of preparing mathematics for public presentation 
– in print or in person – is to get rid of all the loose ends. If 
there is disagreement whether a theorem has really been 
proved, then that theorem will not be included in the text or the 
lecture course. The standard style of expounding mathematics 
purges it of the personal, the controversial, and the tentative, 
producing a work that acknowledges little trace of humanity, 
either in the creators or the consumers. This style is the 
mathematical version of ‘the front’.  
Without it, the myths would lose much of their aura. If 
mathematics were presented in the same style in which it is 
created, few would believe in its universality, unity, certainty, or 
objectivity. (Hersh, 1991: 130-131) 
This brings us to the heart of the issue. Hersh argues that the style in which 
mathematics is presented creates the ‘aura’ of certainty and objectivity that 
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surrounds mathematics. This style creates the impression that mathematics 
produces absolutely certain knowledge based on mechanically logical, deductive 
reasoning. The impression of absolute certainty results because there is no mention 
of any disagreements or controversies, nor any reports of all the mistakes and errors 
made on the way. Furthermore, the ‘impersonal’, ‘objective’, or ‘authoritative’ style in 
which mathematical texts are written,xii ‘acknowledges little trace of humanity’, and 
thus seems to deny any human involvement in the development of new 
mathematical knowledge, creating the impression that mathematics is not something 
that mere humans can do. Accordingly, mathematical results are presented with 
overwhelming self-confidence, as if there could be no possibility of ever getting them 
wrong. Non-mathematicians would seem to have no choice but to accept whatever 
mathematicians tell them is so.xiii  
Hersh is ambiguous on the question whether mathematicians who ‘prepare’ these 
texts and thereby ‘purge’ them of ‘the personal, the controversial, and the tentative’, 
do so calculatively. On the one hand, he argues that ‘there is nothing sinister in this 
separation’ (p. 127), but on the other, he speaks of the backstage activities as going 
on ‘behind closed doors’ (p. 128), which seems conspiratorial. Other authors 
formulate the issue more directly. For example, Ernest speaks of ‘conceal[ment]’ 
while Henrion (1997: 249) argues that ‘[o]ne reason that the mathematics community 
is not more active in conveying a more accurate picture of mathematics is that much 
of the power and prestige of mathematics comes from its claim to certainty and its 
image as an “exact science”.’  
So what kind of picture of mathematics would we get if we were to observe how 
mathematics is ‘actually done’ ‘behind closed doors’? The most common 
characteristics mentioned in the literature are the following: 
 mathematicians are sometimes uncertain about their results; 
 mathematical problem-solving does not proceed by linear deduction; 
 mathematicians make mistakes in their work and therefore have to revise it, 
even to start again; 
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 at many stages in a project, there will be plenty of loose ends. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the supposed differences. 
‘FRONT’ ‘BACK’ 
certain and final results uncertainty, guesses, conjectures 
no mistakes mistakes, false starts, controversies 
no loose ends open questions, things not worked 
through 
deductive reasoning plausible / intuitive reasoning 
Table 1: The supposed differences between the ‘front and ‘back’ regions of 
mathematics 
These features of the ‘back’ of mathematics offer an alternative picture of 
mathematics, according to which mathematics is seen as fallible, uncertain, and 
contingent. In contrast to what people may believe, mathematical results, once 
published, are – and have been – open to revision, and not beyond all possibility of 
doubt. Furthermore, mathematical reasoning is less deductive than the ’front’ 
presents it, but is based on hunches and guesses just like other human activities.  
An important source of proponents of the second picture has been Lakatos’s 
‘fallibilist’ philosophy of mathematics.xiv In Proofs and Refutations, Lakatos (1976) 
provides a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the history of a mathematical problem and its 
solution, namely Euler’s theorem that the number of vertices (V), edges (E), and 
faces (F) of all polyhedra is V + F – E =2. Lakatos argues that when one investigates 
the history of that theorem, one finds that the theorem was not stated and then 
proved definitely once and for all, but rather that it was revised many times in 
different ways as new counterexamples came to light. Through his historical 
reconstruction (recreated as an imagined dialogue in a classroom) Lakatos shows 
that aspects of proofs, definitions, and theorems are sometimes challenged and 
susceptible to change. 
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We will take up the alternative picture and the way that Lakatos has been used after 
having given our empirical examples, but for now we just want to note that Lakatos’s 
‘rational reconstruction’ is not based on access to previously private aspects of 
mathematicians’ work, but rather on published research articles which are part of the 
‘front’ of mathematics. This fact alone shows the paradox involved in using Lakatos 
to argue that the ‘front’ of mathematics presents a misleading picture of 
mathematics. On the one hand, it is argued that the ‘front’ projects an ‘absolutist’ 
picture of mathematics. On the other hand, the main inspiration for an alternative 
picture of mathematics derives from his ‘fallibilist’ picture of mathematics, which in 
turn is derived from the public record that is part of the ‘front’. Although Lakatos, like 
many other critics, attacks formalist or absolutist view of mathematics, he does not 
base his attack on a distinction between ‘front’ and ‘back’. In fact, his argument could 
be seen as an attempt to dispel the contrast between the context of discovery (the 
‘back’) and the context of justification (the ‘front’), since he emphasizes the role of 
proof not just as tool for justification but also for making discoveries (see Ernest, 
1998: 127). 
Our argument is not that there is no value in ‘looking behind the scenes’, but that it is 
questionable as to whether increased familiarity with what goes on ‘in the 
mathematical back’ will lead to any significant revision of understanding of what is on 
show ‘out front’. We therefore prefer the work of Pólya (1957 [1945], 1954, 1981 
[1962, 1965]) on the heuristics of mathematics discovery, which together with 
Popper’s philosophy was the main inspiration for Lakatos. Pólya questions the strict 
separation between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and 
attempts to dispel the idea that the context of discovery belongs entirely to 
psychology. His conception of ‘modern heuristics’ is an attempt to formulate the 
means and methods of mathematical problem solving: the systematic aspects of 
mathematical reasoning/guessing ‘in the back’. The main aim of Pólya’s work is 
pedagogical: that is, he wants to provide both teachers and students with explicit 
heuristics, rather than letting them pick these up as an unformalised part of their 
training. Accordingly, his greatest influence has been in mathematics education 
(Schoenfeld, 1987). Although Pólya also argues that mathematics has ‘two faces’ 
(1957 [1945]: vii) and he distinguishes between ‘demonstrative’ and ‘plausible’ 
reasoning (1954: vi) – between learning by proving and learning by guessing – these 
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are not linked to two different and opposing pictures of mathematics (one a 
misrepresentation, the other not). For Pólya, both of these are seen as part of 
mathematics: ‘they do not contradict each other; on the contrary, they complete each 
other’ (p. vi). In other words, a ‘correct’ picture of mathematics would include aspects 
of both. 
Apart from Pólya, numerous recent sociological and historical studies have exhibited 
different aspects of the practice of mathematics. To mention just a few: Livingston’s 
(1986, 1999, 2006) ethnomethodological investigations of the work involved in 
reading (understanding) mathematical proofs, MacKenzie’s (1993, 1999, 2001) 
studies of the use of computers in mathematical problem solving, Merz and Knorr-
Cetina’s (1997) analysis of collaborative problem-solving practices among theoretical 
physicists, Netz’s (1999) historical exploration of the role of diagrams and other 
notational features in Greek mathematics, Heintz’s (2000, 2003) ethnography of 
research mathematicians at the Max Planck Institute for Mathematics, Rosental’s 
(2003, 2008) analysis of a controversy over a theorem and proof in fuzzy logic, and 
Warwick’s (2003) history of the interplay of educational practices (in particular: the 
Cambridge exam system) and mathematical innovation. All these studies reveal 
important and interesting aspects of how mathematics is done (typically, but not 
exclusively, in the ‘back’). However, since the contrast between ‘doing’ and ‘writing’ 
mathematics does not feature heavily in these studies, we do not discuss these 
extensively. Instead, we want to look at empirical examples, both from the ‘front’ and 
the ‘back’.  
Mathematical lectures: The ‘front’ 
We have been studying different aspects of mathematicians’ practices. In one study, 
we attended and recorded three different graduate lecture courses in mathematical 
logic over several months. Mathematical lectures, as well as mathematical 
textbooks, are one example of mathematics in the ‘front’. They present ‘settled’ 
mathematics and thus, in a sense, are far removed from the ‘hurly burly’ of 
mathematics-in-the-making. Furthermore, the presentation is typically done through 
a long ‘monologue’ with little or no input from the students. For the most part, the 
lecturer is ‘talking-writing’ at the blackboard, giving definitions, theorems, and proofs 
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of those theorems, which are typically available to students in the form of written 
lecture notes distributed at the start of the course (Krantz, 1999: 50).  
We will first present a short fragment that in our view seems to fit Hersh’s 
characterization of the ‘front’. We will then argue that it only fits in a limited way and 
that Hersh’s characterization to some extent misconstrues what goes on in this 
particular case. We then provide a selection of remarks by various lecturers to show 
that many of the aspects that according to Hersh are absent from the ‘front’, are – 
although not commonly – on occasion present in the ‘front’. 
The following example, which involves the setting out of a well established theorem 
and proof, at first sight, fits with Hersh’s picture of the ‘front’. There are two 
blackboards present in this room and the lecturer first writes, at the top right corner 
of the right board, a formulation of a theorem (Figure 1).xv 
 
 
 

S   (i) SLθ,For      1.4  Theorem  
Figure 1: The theorem to be proved 
 
Having written down the theorem on the right board, the lecturer then ‘talks-writes’ 
the proof on the left board (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: The finished proof 
In our view, the written theorem and proof on the blackboard are the clearest 
expression of what Hersh has in mind when he speaks of mathematics in the ‘front’ 
as ‘formal, precise, ordered and abstract’. The finished proof has a formal character, 
a very clear structure, and consists predominantly of formulaic expressions stated in 
abstract symbols. Furthermore, there is nothing in the presentation of the theorem or 
proof that would be characterized as ‘personal, controversial, [or] tentative’. 
However, the presentation of the theorem and proof only fits Hersh’s picture of the 
‘front’ in a very limited way. This is visible when we take a long look at what the 
lecturer is doing while writing. The lecturer is not silently writing down the proof on 
the blackboard, but rather is talking the students through the proof while writing it.xvi 
Figure 3 shows the lecturer at the beginning of the proof and Transcript 1 presents 
his accompanying talk. 
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Figure 3: lecturer at the beginning of the proofxvii 
 
Transcript 1 
 
 
It is true that in the talk accompanying the writing, the lecturer does not express 
anything that could be called his personal views of the theorem or proof, nor mention 
any controversies that may have arisen in the past, nor discuss the stages of 
uncertainty in developing the theorem and proofs. However, the lecturer does 
provide various elaborations, explanations, emphases, and reminders. For example, 
he: 
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 reminds students of a previous result (‘look, we know every valuation is of the 
form vee alpha for some atom alpha’); 
 highlights the importance of a particular step (‘It’s a useful trick to do it this 
way’); 
 points to a previous result (Figure 4); 
 projects that an upcoming step is ‘unusual’ (‘it’s a funny way of saying it but 
you can see for why in a minute’); 
 provides a summary of what he has done so far amounts to mathematically 
(‘That’s why it’s important. That’s why, in a sense, theta can be thought of as 
being made up of the atoms in ess theta.’). 
 
 
Figure 4: pointing to a previous result 
 
When we look in detail at the way the lecturer presents the proof, we see that, 
although the written proof on the page or blackboard may have a ‘formal, precise, 
ordered and abstract’ character, the lecturer does not argue that understanding the 
proof is ‘mechanical’ or ‘automatic’. As Davis and Hersh have noted, mathematicians 
(students and professionals) typically are not able to take in proofs by reading 
through them once at normal speed: 
Why are textbook and monograph presentations of 
mathematics so difficult to follow? The layman might get the 
idea that a skilful mathematician can sight-read a page of 
mathematics in the way that Liszt sight-read a page of difficult 
piano music. This is rarely the case. The absorption of a page 
of mathematics on the part of the professional is often a slow, 
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tedious, and painstaking process. (Davis and Hersh, 1981: 
281) 
In other words, although the lecturer presents a formal, deductive, abstract proof, he 
is not portraying mathematics (or mathematical reasoning) as monotonously formal, 
deductive, or abstract.  
We would argue that the lecturer is predominantly concerned with outlining the 
various techniques and ways of working that are used not just in this proof, but in this 
branch of mathematics. For example, in marking the first step in this proof (V = Vα for 
some atom α) as ‘a useful little trick’, the lecturer lets students know that they could 
possibly use this in connection with other problems. In that sense, lectures in 
mathematics could be seen as an attempt to teach students how proving is done by 
showing what sorts of things count as proofs, what makes them successful as 
proofs, what techniques are employed in organising proofs, and so on.  
Even this example of the ‘technical’ presentation of a theorem and proof thus only 
fits Hersh’s picture of the ‘front’ in a very limited way. When we look at other remarks 
made by lecturers throughout these lectures, we find other aspects that are 
supposedly missing from the ‘front’. Thus lecturers do, on occasion, acknowledge: 
 that finding proofs is difficult (and in no way automatic or mechanical); 
 that understanding proofs requires effort (and is not always easy); 
 that theorems and proofs may have a history (that is, they may have been 
revised in light of counterexamples or mistakes); 
 that mathematicians disagree about particular definitions. 
These acknowledgements are made as low key, matter of course observations 
embedded in the lecture. They are not offered as unprecedented admissions that will 
deeply disturb the ideas the students attending the lecture might have had. For 
example, after giving a proof of a theorem in nonmonotonic logic (a relatively recent 
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development in formal logic), the lecturer states that this proof is more difficult than a 
similar one in ‘classical’ logic: 
Transcript 2 
 
 
The lecturer here explicitly formulates something that students will have encountered 
when tackling their weekly exercise sheets: it is sometimes difficult to find proofs.  
Another way in which a lecturer may demonstrate that understanding the materials is 
difficult (and in no way automatic) is that on occasion he or she may do ‘redundant’ 
things. For example, having written a theorem in two parts, another lecturer 
immediately notes that part one would follow from part two. So why not just prove 
part two? Because the proof of the first part is, in the lecturer’s opinion, easier to 
follow: 
Transcript 3 
 
 
The lecturer here states that understanding a proof is not always easy. However, this 
is not marked in any way as something that would be a surprise to students, 
indicating that the lecturer expects the students to accept this without additional 
comment. 
It is true that, for the most part, historical remarks about the development of the field, 
earlier controversies, or open conjectures did not form part of these lectures. 
Nevertheless, they were not completely absent. For example, another lecturer made 
the following remark about a theorem:  
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Transcript 4 
 
 
Here the lecturer acknowledges (in the ‘front’) that mathematical publications contain 
faulty theorems and proofs and that spotting such mistakes is not easy, even for 
experienced specialists.xviii  
Lecturers may even mention disagreements, as is in the following example, in which 
a lecturer remarks that there are different (competing) views about the ‘correct’ way 
of formalizing ‘belief’: 
Transcript 5 
 
 
It is true that talk about controversies or disagreements was rare. However, in our 
view, the ‘absence’ of such talk is not a form of misrepresentation of mathematics on 
the part of lecturers, but rather a reflection of the fact that what is communicated in 
lectures and textbooks is predominantly part of the ‘archive’ of mathematics (cf., 
Wittgenstein, 1976: 105-107), which is treated as (currently) settled and, indeed, 
definitive of the nature of the field within which the course is sited. Furthermore, 
while controversies and conjectures may be relatively absent from mathematical 
lectures, they are certainly present in another part of the ‘front’ of mathematics, 
namely conference presentations, where presenters do report open questions and 
conjectures.xix 
In sum, when we look at the variety of remarks made in lectures, we find that 
lectures only superficially fit Hersh’s picture of the ‘front’. Firstly, although the lecturer 
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presents the theorem and proof in a ‘formal, precise, ordered and abstract’ manner, 
the lecturer does not communicate that understanding the proof is in any way a 
mechanical or automatic process (otherwise, why would the lecturer spend so much 
effort at making visible how the proof ‘works’?). Secondly, although remarks about 
the development of the field, earlier disagreements or problems, and open 
conjectures are rare, they are not completely absent and are furthermore presented 
as commonplaces (and not as destabilising students’ understanding of the nature of 
mathematics). Thirdly, the reason for this relative absence is in our view not an 
attempt to make mathematics appear more certain than it ‘really is’, but a 
consequence of the instructional emphasis on explaining the technical details of the 
theorem and proof, and the implied relevancies of such an emphasis. 
None of this is to say that there might not be good arguments for changing the style 
of presenting mathematics. Mathematicians do, on occasion, have discussions about 
the ‘best’ way of presenting mathematics. For example, some mathematicians do not 
like the current ‘formalist’ way of presenting mathematics.xx However, it should be 
noted that a succinct presentation style does not have only disadvantages. Heintz 
(2000: 123) points out that the style of mathematical texts has not just ‘strategic’, but 
also ‘communicative’, functions. If all contingencies, uncertainties, false avenues, 
etc. were displayed, mathematical papers would no longer be readable. In other 
words, the style of writing facilitates mathematical communication rather excluding 
information essential to understanding the mathematics.xxi 
It may be that a different presentation style would bring educational benefits, i.e., 
remove ‘learning obstacles’ (Ernest, 2008: 67). This argument is often based on the 
view that neither the lecturer nor the students are in any way engaged in 
mathematical discovery during these lectures. If all that students do is take up 
existing proofs, how are they ever to learn how to create proofs themselves? 
However, it is important to note that studying existing proofs is not something that is 
completely discontinuous with coming up with new proofs. As Davis and Hersh 
acknowledge, professional mathematicians also need to study proofs to understand 
what they are saying and how they work (in other words, studying proofs is not 
something that only outsiders do). Furthermore, as Davis and Hersh also observe, 
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studying proofs in this fashion is one way for students to become familiar with what is 
involved in the creation of new mathematics: 
Proof, in its best instances, increases understanding by 
revealing the heart of the matter. Proof suggests new 
mathematics. The novice who studies proofs gets closer to the 
creation of new mathematics. Proof is mathematical power, the 
electric voltage of the subject which vitalizes the static 
assertions of the theorems. (Davis and Hersh, 1981: 151) 
In other words, understanding how to do proving on your own behalf is the reciprocal 
of understanding how proving has been done, which equates to understanding of 
what proving is. Students who study proofs are coming to understand what, in an 
important sense, mathematics is, namely, accumulated collections of proofs. By 
learning and understanding the proofs, they are familiarising themselves with a major 
resource for any innovative mathematical work of their own; namely, the knowledge 
of what has already been proved and of the forms and techniques legitimately used 
in those proofs.  
What we are sceptical about is Hersh’s claim that a different way of presenting 
mathematics would lead to the disappearance of the various myths about 
mathematics. We have argued that the traditional ‘Euclid myth’ picture of 
mathematics does not directly emerge from the current style of presenting 
mathematics. If we are right, then it does not follow that a new way of presenting 
mathematics would do away with the mythical ideas. Establishing the in-principle 
point that mathematicians sometimes make errors requires only one or two 
examples, but it is not clear what a detailed history of each proof’s formation would 
actually teach.  
Supervision meetings: the ‘back’ 
In a second study, we attended for almost a year the weekly meetings between a 
supervisor and his doctoral students. These meetings are one example of 
mathematics in the ‘back’, since we encounter mathematics-in-the-making rather 
than finished mathematics. The style of discussion between supervisor and doctoral 
students is very different from that found in the lecture and could, without close 
inspection, easily be characterized as ‘fragmentary, informal, intuitive, tentative’. 
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Furthermore, supervisors and doctoral students frequently ‘try this or that’ and ‘say 
“maybe” or “it looks like”’. We will argue that this neither shows that the ‘back’ is 
permeated with ‘uncertainty’, nor that the mathematical resources in use are being 
treated as less dependable than they are presented as being in mathematical 
publications. 
In the meetings with a first-year doctoral student doing research in probability logic, 
the supervisor and student initially spent a lot of time trying to find a ‘doable’ problem 
the student could work on (cf., Fujimura, 1987; Delamont et al., 2000). They finally 
focussed on the problem of generalizing a theorem that the supervisor had 
previously proven and published (on a new way to draw inferences from an 
inconsistent set).  
The following episode, taken from a meeting a few months after the start of the 
student’s doctorate, is fairly typical. Prior to the meeting, the student has handed in a 
sketch of a proof, which the supervisor has read. At the beginning of the meeting, the 
supervisor tells the student that he does not think that the sketch is currently detailed 
enough and that he is rather doubtful that the student will be able to prove the result 
the student claims to prove (that is, the supervisor finds the idea of being able to 
prove this result mathematically implausible). In response, the student goes to the 
blackboard and goes through his idea in more detail (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: student demonstrating his idea at the blackboard 
Listening to the student, the supervisor is not able to ‘see’ the proof. However, 
neither is the supervisor able to see any ‘obvious’ snags. In order to get a better 
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understanding, the supervisor in turn goes to the blackboard and attempts to work 
through the student’s proposed idea himself (Figure 6). While doing so, the 
supervisor frequently checks with the student whether he has understood him 
correctly (e.g., by asking ‘and what you wanna do is …?’).  
 
Figure 6: supervisor working through the student’s idea 
 
The supervisor (SU) asks the student (ST) a variety of questions, ‘interrogating’ the 
student – and thereby the student’s proposed idea – in the hope either of pinpointing 
an obvious ‘fault’ or confirming that the student’s idea ‘really’ works. The following is 
a good example: 
Transcript 6.1 
 
Although we cannot give all the necessary background information of what is going 
on in this particular case, we think it is visible that the supervisor is asking ‘probing’ 
questions in order to find out, in what has sketched on the blackboard, whether 
something might be missing or whether one part of the presented argument might 
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contradict another one. The student gives defensive responses that the supervisor 
cannot decisively reject, but that do not completely satisfy him either. In fact, even 
the student is not completely sure that his idea will work: 
Transcript 6.2 
 
 
In response, the supervisor explains why he does not think that the student can 
prove the result that he claims. He thinks that the student is asserting a much 
stronger result than anticipated:  
Transcript 6.3 
 
 
The supervisor is saying that the arguments put forward by the student would seem 
to allow proving a much stronger result (which does not depend on n — the size of 
the set Γ) than he anticipates. As noted, however, the supervisor is not able to find 
either an obvious flaw in the student’s argumentation or (within the limits of this 
meeting) a quick counter-example that would show that the result that the student is 
seemingly proving is false. The difference between the supervisor and student is not 
resolved in this meeting and the episode ends with the supervisor advising the 
student: ‘well I think you should write that one out in detail’. 
It is clear that this is a different kind of activity from the mathematical lecture, where 
there was indeed an ‘air of certainty’: the lecturer knew that all the theorems had 
proofs and if for some reason he forgot how to prove a particular theorem he could 
simply look it up. In contrast, in this meeting there is an ‘air of uncertainty’: the 
doctoral student is not completely sure that his idea will work, but neither is the 
supervisor absolutely certain that the student will be unable to prove the stronger 
result.  
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Hersh characterizes the ‘back’ as ‘fragmentary, informal, intuitive, tentative’, and this 
excerpt would seem to fit that picture. Rather than working on a ‘complete’ proof, 
both supervisor and student are working on a more or less worked out ‘idea’. Both 
are currently working at the level of guesses and ‘gut feelings’ about the value of that 
idea and both are somewhat tentative: the idea looks good to the student but he 
acknowledges that he might be overlooking a problem (‘maybe I’m missing out on 
something’); the supervisor remains sceptical but cannot find an obvious fault in the 
student’s arguments. The supervisor cannot ‘check’ the proof in detail, because the 
relevant detail has not yet been worked out and written down. The supervisor’s 
questions to the student thus attempt to solicit more strategic detail, since the 
student’s hope to deliver the proof depends upon its detailed realisation. 
The thing that strikes us the most about this supervision meeting is the following: the 
student has given a rough outline idea of a proof (van Bendegem, 1988) – and an 
idea by its very nature is only partially worked out. However, the idea is offered as a 
preliminary move — as only anticipating a conclusive spelling out. Thus, both 
supervisor and student are assuming that having an ‘idea’ is not enough and that, in 
this case at least, the partial presentation is not enough to make the idea firmly 
convincing – that the idea can work is, for the supervisor, questionable on the face of 
it, requiring that the student establish that it can stand up by working it out in full. 
What the supervisor and student are doing is directed toward, and compared to, 
standards that call for something ‘formal, precise, ordered and abstract’, and they 
measure their current moves against the possibility of turning them into just that. As 
Coleman (2009: 30) notes: ‘Although proofs, or more often their leading ideas, are 
frequently conveyed by word of mouth, only written proofs count as establishing a 
theorem.’  
This nicely shows that the ‘front’ and the ‘back’ are not in opposition. It is not as 
though the work in the ‘back’ goes on without a concern for the formation of a tight 
and tidy logical sequence which is later added only for purposes of presentation. The 
demands of tight, tidy and logically sequenced construction are very much at stake in 
the work in hand. ‘Informal, tentative, and intuitive’ may characterise the way in 
which the supervisor and student are testing out the idea, but this is because they 
are anticipating work that needs to be done. This does not suggest that they are 
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using different (more relaxed, more informal) standards of proof than would apply to 
a published proof. The difference between the ‘front’ and the ‘back’ then is not 
between two kinds of proof, one ‘formal, precise, ordered and abstract’ and the other 
‘fragmentary, informal, intuitive, and tentative’. Rather, it is a difference between 
different stages: of working with an incomplete idea of a possible proof as opposed 
to presenting a (presumably) complete, thoroughly worked-out-a-proof.  
It is important to note that not mentioning something is not the same as concealing it. 
In our view, the temptation to think that a mathematical paper is a misrepresentation 
of what happens in the ‘back’ is based on a view that treats the paper as a 
description (in the form of sociological or historical report) of the discovery 
processes, rather than as a presentation of the relevantly interrelated mathematical 
matters. A published mathematical proof does not give an ‘accurate’ description of 
how the theorem was worked out in the first place, but neither does it give an 
‘inaccurate’ one, since it does not purport to give any such a description. The idea 
that the form of a finalised proof provides a description of the mathematical 
reasoning that produced it is about as wise as thinking that Hollywood blockbusters 
ought to be viewed as documentaries about their own production. The published 
mathematical paper provides a statement of the proof that has been (successfully) 
worked out, not a description of how its author(s) put it together and prepared it for 
publication. The paper delivers the results of their efforts, not a record of the efforts 
themselves. 
Hersh argues that non-mathematicians are not familiar with what happens in the 
‘back’ and we would agree with that. Not many people will have seen or experienced 
exchanges such as the one between the supervisor and his doctoral student. Hersh 
is right that these are not widely reported in publications or popular media. However, 
Hersh’s central claim is based on the view that exposure to the ‘back’ would allow ‘to 
develop a less naive, more sophisticated attitude towards the myths of the 
profession’ (p. 132). In contrast, we wonder whether such exposure would come as a 
much of a shock. 
If we take another look at Goffman’s frontstage/backstage metaphor with respect to 
restaurants, it is certainly the case that there is a separation between the quiet, 
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orderly ‘front’ dining area and the messy, chaotic, smelly ‘back’ kitchen. Furthermore, 
the ‘back’ of establishments is frequently ‘concealed’ from customers, but are they 
thereby ‘misled’, or, as Hersh puts it himself, is it more that they are ‘enthralled’? In 
other words, is the separation between ‘front’ and ‘back’ an attempt at deceiving the 
customers or a way of maximising their enjoyment? Hersh himself notes that the 
‘myth, in many cases, adds to the customer’s enjoyment of the performance’, which 
is a far cry from saying that the myth is created in order to boost the status of, e.g., 
restaurants. What would the reaction of customers be if they were ‘exposed’ to the 
‘backs’ of restaurants? Would it be shock and disillusion? These days some 
restaurants include the ‘back’ in the ‘front’ by having a large window in the dining 
area into the kitchen (making available in the ‘front’ what is happening in the ‘back’). 
It could be said that such displays change the experience of going to restaurants, but 
we wonder whether it is best characterised as a change from a ‘misleading’ to a 
‘faithful’ picture of the workings of restaurants. 
Goffman illustrates his general thesis with examples, in which ’giving off’ back region 
information to the audience would discredit the public performance, in particular, in 
the case of confidence tricksters. However, it is not Goffman’s thesis that the division 
always plays a falsifying role, rather that it often plays a functional one: what goes on 
out of sight of the (actual or potential audience) enables the public performance to be 
successful, organises the performers so they know what they are supposed to do 
when they are ‘on’ (the weeks of rehearsal for a show), or provides temporary 
opportunities to ease any rigorous demands on the performance (such as when 
taking a coffee break from the strain of keeping up a polite demeanour to rude, 
aggressive, and annoying customers). Hersh does recognise that the back region 
facilitates realisation of a quality performance, but seems mainly to imply that what 
goes on in that region would discredit the public performance, at least with respect to 
the ‘certainty’ of mathematics. It is as if access to information about mathematician’s 
prepublication work would be what Goffman calls an ‘inopportune intrusion’: 
When an outsider accidentally enters a region in which a 
performance is being given, or when a member of the audience 
inadvertently enters the backstage, the intruder is likely to catch 
those present flagrante delicto. Through no one’s intention, the 
persons present in the region may find that they have patently 
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been witnessed in activity that is quite incompatible with the 
impression that they are, for wider social reasons, under 
obligation to maintain to the intruder. (Goffman, 1956: 132) 
What, though, would count as a case of mathematical flagrante delicto? Hersh thinks 
that the fact that mathematical investigators speak provisionally amongst themselves 
is at odds with the image of relentless certainty. However, the questioning, tentative, 
uncertain tone of the supervisory exchange does not betray any lack of confidence in 
the mathematics they are using, deriving more from the fact that they have selected 
a project that they should be able to do, but that will nonetheless be a challenge for 
them. Though there are anticipations of how things might turn out, of what routes 
might engender a proof, those anticipations are not assured of fulfilment, for it is only 
through doing the work of forming (parts of) the proof in detail that it will be found out 
whether those anticipations can be fulfilled. From the fact that, by the time they have 
got something to publish, they will be pretty certain of what they have done it would 
be just gratuitous to construe them as implying that they were always equally certain.  
Goffman also suggests that the front/back separation allows performers to talk about 
the audience in a derogatory manner in the ‘back’: 
When the members of a team go backstage where the 
audience cannot see or hear them, they very regularly derogate 
the audience in a way that is inconsistent with the face-to-face 
treatment that is given to the audience. In service trades, for 
example, customers who are treated respectfully during the 
performance are often ridiculed, gossiped about, caricatured, 
cursed, and criticized when the performers are backstage …. 
(Goffman, 1956: 108) 
However, how is this applicable to mathematics? What we have observed so far 
‘behind closed doors’ does not seem to point to mathematicians being ‘two-faced’, 
holding one view of mathematics in presentation and publications, while secretly 
having a different view of mathematics (and a disdain for the ‘outsiders’ who take the 
public image as face value). We would argue that their view of mathematics is fairly 
consistent, both at the ‘front’ and at the ‘back’.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have engaged with the question of whether the form of presenting 
mathematics (in lectures or textbooks) explains the existence of various myths about 
it. We have argued that the different exposures to the ‘front’ (by outsiders) and to the 
‘back’ (by insiders) is not responsible for the myths, not least because some of the 
major exponents of myths about mathematics are themselves high achieving 
mathematicians, possessing a deep familiarity with practices in the ‘back’ region.  
In our view, the idea that the form of mathematical publications encourages myths 
about certainty results from drawing an invalid inference from a plain fact, which is 
that historical commentary and documentation of ‘the context of discovery’ is almost 
entirely absent from mathematical lectures and papers. This absence might indicate 
that the published matter has no prior history, and that the deductive structure of the 
exposited proof is a description of the discovery process. However, as we have 
argued, rather being ‘misrepresentations’ of the nature of mathematics, these 
aspects of proofs are expressions of the interests of mathematicians in the technical 
details of theorems and proofs.  
The idea that the public mathematical record hides the fallibility of mathematics is 
based upon too narrow a consideration, concentrating only on the format of the 
single mathematical paper and focussing, for example, only on the fact that the 
individual paper setting out a theorem and proof usually does not also describe the 
difficulties and failings that may have featured in their creation. Such a ‘failure’ to 
describe should not be taken to suggest that there were no difficulties. Such a 
‘failure’ is a poor basis for inferring that mathematics hides its fallibility, since a 
survey of a relatively few mathematical papers is likely to show that mathematicians 
are aware of, acknowledge, and routinely publicise, errors in their own or other 
mathematicians’ papers.xxii  
The ‘myth of certainty’ about mathematics seems to survive in face of the ‘loss of 
certainty’ precipitated by such world-renowned developments as non-Euclidean 
geometries and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. This, in our view, shows that the 
various myths of mathematics do not originate in the differences between 
mathematics in the ‘front’ and the ‘back’. While the myth of certainty does need 
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dispelling, we think that the front/back contrast risks creating a counter-myth, the 
‘myth of uncertainty’.  
Lakatos is often cited for replacing the myth of certainty with a fallibilist view of 
mathematics, but his ideas are completely independent of the ‘front/‘back’ contrast, 
since his study draws upon published articles (entirely from the ‘front’). Furthermore, 
Lakatos’ fallibilism says nothing about how seriously, in what ways, and with what 
consequences existing mathematics may be ‘in error’.xxiii His argument is about the 
logical status of mathematical claims and his ‘fallibilism’ holds that mathematical 
statements do not express absolute certainties. Lakatos argues that mathematical 
claims are conjectures, but this has to be understood in relation to Popper’s sense of 
conjectures, not in the mathematical sense of an ‘open question’ (see endnote xix). 
Mathematical statements are conjectures in the sense that, for any mathematical 
proposition the possibility of a counter example cannot logically be excluded. 
Lakatos’ argument applies to mathematical statements (in the ‘front’) and he agrees 
that any conception of these as unquestionably true is simply a misunderstanding of 
the kinds of statements they are.  
We would not like our arguments against the way in which the front/back distinction 
has been applied to mathematics to be taken as implying that there is no point or 
value in looking ‘behind the scenes’ of mathematical practice, not least because this 
is what we ourselves have been doing. We have only argued that it should not be 
expected that increased familiarity with what goes on ‘in the mathematical back’ will 
lead to any significant revision of understanding of what is on show ‘out front’. In our 
examples, we have tried to show that ‘working behind the scenes’ in mathematics 
does not involve being exposed to a kind of reasoning that conflicts with the kind that 
appears ‘up front’. The only difference is, of course, that one is exposed to as-yet-
still-exploratory reasoning, rather than provably successful examples, which is only a 
restatement of the difference between currently unfinished and finished work.  
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Notes 
i As Schickore (2008: 324) points out, this contrast has a long history that goes back 
at least to Reichenbach’s (1938) distinction between ‘the context of discovery’ and 
‘the context of justification’. 
ii This way of phrasing things raises questions about the kind of writing in question, in 
particular, its intended audience. We address this ambiguity more explicitly below. 
iii The argument that scientific papers misrepresent or distort how science is actually 
done has been made, inter alia, by Mulkay (1976: 642), Latour and Woolgar (1979: 
28), Gilbert and Mulkay (1980: 277), Knorr-Cetina (1981: 94-95), and Delamont and 
Atkinson (2001: 102-103). For a different way of dealing with the contrast see Lynch 
et al. (1983: 210) and Lynch (1985: 150-154). 
iv For example, Davis and Hersh (1981: 325), Watson (1990: 283), Hersh (1991: 
129), and Dowling (2001: 21). 
v For example, Borba and Skovsmose (1997), Ernest (1991: 260; 1998: xii), and 
Henrion (1997: 255). 
vi See Davis and Hersh (1981: 151), Thurston (1994: 163), or Weber (2004: 116). 
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vii Thus Rota (1991: 172): ‘Mathematicians take mischievous pleasure in faking the 
arbitrariness of definition. In actual fact, no mathematical definition is arbitrary. The 
theorems of mathematicians motivate the definitions as much as the definitions 
motivate the theorems. A good definition is “justified” by the theorems one can prove 
with it, just like the proof of a theorem is “justified” by appealing to a previously given 
definition. There is thus, a hidden circularity in formal mathematical exposition. The 
theorems are proved starting with definitions, but the definitions themselves are 
motivated by the theorems that we have previously decided ought to be right.’ 
viii See also Borasi (1992: 161), Crawford et al. (1996: 466), Kemeny (2003: 1549), 
Livingston (2006: 60), and Powell and Brantlinger (2008: 428). 
ix The article appeared first in Eureka, the journal of the Cambridge University 
Mathematical Society (Hersh, 1988), and was then reprinted in the journal Synthese 
(Hersh, 1991). An edited version forms part of Hersh’s book What Is Mathematics, 
Really? (Hersh, 1997: 35-39). 
x Hersh assumes this, but others suppose that the mathematicians themselves may 
have swallowed the myths or ideology about their own discipline.  
xi Conversely, it is sometimes argued that the way that mathematics is presented in 
the ‘front’ is the reason that so many people do not enjoy mathematics.  
xii See also, for example, Davis and Hersh (1981: 36), Morgan (1998: 11), and Burton 
and Morgan (2000: 435). 
xiii According to David Bloor (1976, 1994) many people (falsely) believe in the 
universality of mathematics, assuming for example that 2 + 2 must equal 4, and 
therefore do not realize the conventional character of mathematics (for example, the 
use of a decimal rather than binary notation). The aim of Bloor’s sociology of 
mathematics is thus to demonstrate that mathematical propositions ‘could have been 
otherwise’ and thereby to show that no one is compelled to accept these 
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propositions on the grounds that they could not possibly be otherwise (these views 
are questioned in Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, 2009a,b). 
xiv See, for example, Bloor (1976, Chapter 7), Davis and Hersh (1981, Chapter 7), 
and Ernest (1998, Chapter 4).  
xv This theorem states that for all sentences theta of the language SL, the sentence 
theta is logically equivalent to disjunction of all the sentences in the set S . 
xvi The exact relationship between what a lecturer says and writes on the board is 
rather intricate and would form an interesting topic of investigation in its own right.  
xvii Many thanks to Jonas Ivarsson (University of Gothenburg) for help in the 
preparation of these images (see, for example, Ivarsson, 2010).  
xviii As Lakatos (1976: 4, n. 1) remarks: ‘But often the checking of an ordinary 
(informal) proof is a very delicate enterprise, and to hit on a “mistake” requires as 
much insight and luck as to hit on a proof: the discovery of “mistakes” in informal 
proofs may sometimes take decades – if not centuries.’ 
xix An illustration of this is provided by Higham (1998: 17): ‘A fifth kind of statement 
used in mathematical writing is a conjecture – a statement that the author thinks may 
be true but has been unable to prove or disprove. … A famous computer scientist 
(let us call him Alpha) joked in a talk “This is the Alpha and Beta conjecture. If it turns 
out to be false I would like it to be known as Beta’s conjecture.” However, it is not 
necessarily a bad thing to make a conjecture that is later disproved: identifying the 
question that the conjecture aims to answer can be an important contribution.’ 
xx Burton and Morgan (2000: 449), for example, quote a mathematician who calls for 
changes: ‘I get annoyed with some of my collaborators and a lot of the papers I am 
sent, which are definition, theorem, lemma, proof. That seems to me to be 
appallingly bad. It is the sort of thing that no one is ever going to want to read. I think 
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it is important to grab the reader from the opening sentence. Not “Let A be a class of 
algebras such that …” Change it to “This paper opens a new chapter in duality 
theory.”’ 
xxi A similar remark is made by the mathematician Paul Halmos (1970: 127): ‘The 
discoverer of an idea, who may of course be the same as its expositor, stumbled on 
it helter-skelter, inefficiently, almost at random. If there were no way to trip to 
consolidate, and to rearrange the discovery, every student would have to 
recapitulate it, there would be no advantage to be gained from standing “on the 
shoulder of giants”, and there would never be time to learn something new that the 
previous generation did not know.’ 
xxii Fisher (1973: 1101), in a study of the various attempts to solve the Poincaré 
conjecture, reports: ‘Soon after the statement of the conjecture was published, a 
well-known mathematician published a proof of it. He immediately uncovered an 
error in his demonstration and in the next issue of the journal pointed out his 
mistakes.’ Similarly, Brown (2009: 232) states that mathematicians are aware of 
mistakes: ‘Everyone – especially a working mathematician – will admit that the 
literature (including at least two of this writer’s own papers) contains mistakes.’  
xxiii As Koetsier (1991: 45) pointedly asks: ‘If mathematical knowledge is fallible, how 
fallible is it?’  
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